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Boom Times for Selective Institutions
The economy bloomed like a plant that had
been cut back and could now grow quicker
and stronger. Our economic program brought
about the longest peacetime expansion in our
history: real family income up, the poverty
rate down, entrepreneurship booming, and an
explosion in research and new technology.
Ronald Reagan, 1989'
THE FACT THAT motivates the present study is the extraordinary in-
crease in per-student expenditures and tuition levels in private col-
leges and universities beginning about 1980. The preceding chapter
reviews a number of explanations for this escalation, but the ques-
tion that remains unanswered is, Why did the escalation happen
when it did? Before examining in detail the four institutions in this
study, it is necessary to focus on the time period during which these
dramatic increases in spending and tuition occurred. Was this period
unusual in any way? To what extent are the trends observed in the
sample institutions likely to be characteristic of private institutions in
general?
In order to provide a historical context for the detailed analyses to
follow, this chapter begins by noting several developments that
occurred over the period covered by the current study, roughly cor-
responding to the decade of the 1980s. Following this review is a
detailed examination of the increases in tuitions at the four sample
institutions, and comparisons with a broader range of similar col-
leges and universities. A brief concluding section notes the connec-
tion among these various developments.
WHAT WAS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT THE 1980s?
As higher education officials entered the 1980s, they anticipated that
a dominant theme of the decade would be demographic decline,WHAT WAS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT THE 1980s? 59
with the number of 18-year-olds expected to fall by 25 percent be-
tween 1979 and 1992. To almost everyone's surprise, owing to in-
creases in the enrollment rates of most demographic groups, enroll-
ments did not decline.
2 Moreover, the decade turned out to be a
prosperous one indeed, buoyed by a confluence of several largely
independent favorable trends in the economy. Private colleges and
universities as a whole enjoyed a surge in demand, as measured by
the number of applications they received.
3 In setting the context for
the empirical analysis that follows, it is useful to review several of the
most important developments of the 1980s that affected higher edu-
cation in general and private research universities in particular. Six
developments are noted: (1) the improvement in the economic well-
being of the most affluent households, (2) the increase in the
economic returns to college training, (3) the concentration of top
students in selective colleges and universities, (4) the slowdown in
overall inflation in the economy, (5) the rise in real faculty salaries,
and (6) the change in the nature of federal support for university
research and student financial aid.
Economic Gains Among the Affluent
The 1980s was an especially good decade for those on the top rungs
of the economic ladder. In the words of Phillips (1990, p. xii), the
decade witnessed "the triumph of upper America." The most promi-
nent bellwether of this improvement was a robust increase in in-
comes at the top of the income distribution. During the 15-year pe-
riod covered in the present study, between 1977 and 1992, the mean
income of families in the top quintile of the income distribution in-
creased at an annual rate of 1.1 percent, after inflation. By compari-
son, the incomes of the remaining four-fifths of families barely grew,
increasing at only 0.2 percent per year.
4 As illustrated in Figure 3.1,
the success enjoyed by those at the top of the income distribution
began well before the 1980s. Although the trajectory of the top
quintile's average income was not an unbroken string of increases,
the overall pattern was one of strong growth, which contrasts mark-
edly with the stagnation of everyone else's incomes during this pe-
riod.
The well-being of the affluent also received a boost from the tax
cuts of 1981 and 1986; the marginal tax rate in the highest income
classes dropped over the decade from 70 percent to 28 percent.
5
These reductions partly were offset by a broader definition of tax-
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Figure 3.1 Mean Incomes, Top 20 Percent and Others, 1967—1992.
Source: Table 3A.1.
to reduce the effective average tax rates for those in upper-income
classes.
6
A similar increase in the relative well-being of the most affluent
households occurred in wealth holding. The 1980s was a decade of
solid gains in both stocks and owner-occupied housing, two of the
most important sources of wealth for households. After a decade of
tepid advance, stock prices rose rapidly during the 1980s: the S&P
500 increased by 181 percent during the 1980s, compared with only
43 percent during the previous decade (U.S. Council of Economic
Advisers 1993, p. 453). House prices rose as well, spectacularly in a
few metropolitan areas.
7 Another form of wealth the value of which
skyrocketed during the decade was art, with Sotheby's aggregate art
index increasing more than threefold from 1980 to 1989 (Phillips
1990, Appendix J). In the midst of these advances, the wealthiest
households appear to have done especially well. Data from the Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances suggest that the share of total net worth
held by the wealthiest 1 percent of households increased from 31.5
percent in 1983 to 37.1 percent in 1989 (U.S. House of Representa-
tives 1992a, p. 1566).
Not only were the incomes and wealth of the most affluent fami-
lies increasing, their average family size fell disproportionately, fur-
ther increasing their ability to bear the financial burden of collegeWHAT WAS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT THE 1980s? 61
for their children. Between 1977 and 1992, the average size of all
families fell 5.1 percent, from 3.33 persons in 1979 to 3.16 in 1992.
Over the same period, the average size of families with incomes of
$65,000 or more in 1992 dollars (roughly the lower bound for the
top quintile of families) fell from 3.72 to 3.38, a decrease of 9.1
percent.
8 With fewer children to put through college, these affluent
families had even more resources to finance the college educations
of those children whom they did send.
These facts have special relevance for the set of selective institu-
tions that constitute the main focus of the present study. In addition
to having unusually high average test scores and strong high school
records, the students at these colleges and universities tend to be
more affluent than the average college student, and considerably
more so than the average high school graduate.
9 Thus, the improve-
ment in the well-being of those at the top of the income distribution
fueled their demand for consumption of many kinds, including elite
higher education.
Increase in the Economic Returns from College
Among the benefits of attending college is the likelihood that a stu-
dent's lifetime earnings will increase as a result. On average, college
graduates earn more than similarly situated individuals who do not
have a college degree. Although it is not a simple matter to deter-
mine what portion of this earnings advantage is attributable directly
to college education, as distinct from other personal characteristics
possessed by college graduates, movements in this earnings advan-
tage do reflect variations over time in the financial rewards of college
training. Like other investments that require financial sacrifices in
order to reap future rewards, a college education can be said to pay
off for most students and, to the extent that higher earnings signify
greater productivity, for society. One ready indicator of the rate of
return to a college education is the earnings advantage that college
graduates enjoy over high school graduates. During the 1970s, this
earnings advantage fell noticeably, leading to concerns that America
was "overinvesting" in college education.
1
0 After hitting its nadir
around 1980, however, the college earnings advantage rebounded
sharply, rising more or less steadily through the decade."
Table 3.1 presents earnings data for the four years examined in
the present study, comparing mean earnings of high school gradu-
ates with those of college graduates holding only a bachelor's degree.
For men, the percentage difference in the two earnings levels, corre-62 BOOM TIMES FOR SELECTIVE INSTITUTIONS
TABLE 3.1
Mean Earnings, by Education, for Full-Time, Year-Round Workers,
Ages 25—34, Selected Years
Men



































Source: Data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series
P—60, Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the United States (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). For data for 1977: No. 118 (1979), Table 47;
for data for 1982: No. 142 (1984), Table 47; for data for 1987: No. 162 (1989), Table
35; and for data for 1992: No. 184 (1993), Table 29.
Note: High school graduates include those with four years of high school or a high
school diploma only. College graduates include those with four years of college or a
bachelor's degree only.
sponding roughly to the college earnings advantage, increased from
19 percent in 1977 to an impressive 54 percent by 1992. The pattern
for women was much the same, with the difference growing from 25
to 53 percent. The size of the gap in 1992 is the highest recorded in
25 years. Although this rebound may have had more to do with a
decline in the earnings of high school graduates than with an in-
crease in those of college graduates, it nevertheless highlights one
aspect of the increase in the demand for college. The extent to
which this growing earnings gap increased the demand for elite col-
leges and universities such as those studied in this book is unclear.
Growing Concentration of Top Students
Not only did a college degree become a more valuable commodity
during the 1980s, but places at elite, mostly private colleges and uni-
versities apparently became relatively more attractive as well. Cook
and Frank (1993) present data suggesting that these elite institutions
enrolled an increasing share of the nation's best students. As an illus-
tration, they calculated the share of freshmen with high SAT verbal
scores who enrolled in a group of highly selective colleges and uni-
versities, a group that together enrolled about 25,000, or about 2.5WHAT WAS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT THE 1980s? 63
percent of all freshmen in the country. Between 1979 and 1989, this
group's share of all freshmen with SAT verbal scores of 700 or
higher increased markedly, from 32 to 43 percent. Similarly, the
finalists in the Westinghouse Science Talent Search increasingly
became concentrated in a small number of elite institutions. Using
the results of previous econometric analyses of college applications,
Cook and Frank show that the probability of a high school senior
with a high SAT score applying to at least 1 of a group of 33 private
selective institutions increased between 1976 and 1987. For example,
the probability that a hypothetical student with a combined score of
1300 would apply to one of these institutions increased from .36 to
.56 (Cook and Frank 1993, pp. 131-3). Although the average num-
ber of applications per student also was increasing over time, this
increase is another indication of the apparent growth in the attrac-
tiveness of places in selective institutions, particularly among the
strongest applicants.
A Surprising Slowdown in Inflation
One feature of the rosy economic environment of the 1980s was a
marked deceleration in the overall rate of inflation. As the 1970s
ended, inflation had accelerated sharply, for the second time in the
decade. In the three years beginning with 1979, buffeted by sharp
increases in the cost of fuel, the CPI experienced annual jumps of
9.0, 13.3, and 12.5 percent, respectively. As suddenly as it had be-
gun, however, this inflation cooled: from 1982 to 1990, the CPI
grew at an annual rate of only 3.8 percent (U.S. Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers 1994, pp. 335, 339).
How might this slowdown in inflation have affected colleges and
universities? Faculty certainly had little trouble comparing their sal-
ary increases with the inflation rate; as the figures presented below
indicate, faculty lost ground during the late 1970s. What may be of
more importance for higher education finance is the extent to which
changes in inflation—both the acceleration and the subsequent slow-
ing—were unanticipated. Not only was the inflation of the late 1970s
severe, but it exceeded the rates predicted by most macroeconomic
models. Then, for most of the 1980s, the reverse pattern occurred:
widely accepted forecasts of inflation were too pessimistic, and con-
sistently so. This pattern of persistent overestimation of inflation is
illustrated in Figure 3.2, which compares two-year averages of actual
inflation with forecasts that had been published by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) for the corresponding periods. For example,64 BOOM TIMES FOR SELECTIVE INSTITUTIONS
1976-77 1978-79 1980-81 1982-83 1984-85 1986-87
Two-Year Period
1988-89 1990-91
--- Forecast — Actual
Figure 3.2 Forecast Versus Actual Inflation.
Source: Table 3A.2.
the CBO's forecasts of inflation for the calendar years 1976 and
1977, each made 12 months before the corresponding year was to
begin, averaged 7.1 percent. Actual inflation for the two years aver-
aged 6.1 percent, for an overstatement of one percentage point. As
the figure shows, forecasts of inflation were too low for the period
from 1977-78 through 1980-81 and were too high until 1987-88.
The average error in the period of underestimation was 3.0 percent;
the average error in the period of overestimation was 1.5 percent.
That this pattern of forecast errors, resulting in consistently pleas-
ant inflation surprises, may have affected the real increases in spend-
ing is a reasonable supposition, especially if institutions tended to be
slow to respond. Administrators developing budgets for a fiscal year
necessarily must begin to work at least 12 months before that year
begins and therefore must rely on forecasts of inflation. Any attempt
to target expenditures in terms of real levels will necessitate adding
expected inflation. This behavior certainly would apply to the setting
of such important parameters as the overall increases for wages and
salaries and the increase in tuition and fees. If budgets were set, year
after year, using inflation projections that consistently overestimated
actual inflation, real spending would tend to rise faster than in-
tended. Whether such surprises would have similar effects for aWHAT WAS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT THE 1980s? 65
number years running is unclear, but evidence shows that, for at
least one of the institutions covered in the present study, the impact
of consistent overestimates of inflation did not go unnoticed. The
minutes of Carleton College's budget committee reveal a recurrent
complaint by students on the committee—that budget projections
using inflation assumptions that subsequently proved to be too high
had the effect of increasing tuition more than planned. In 1986, the
committee agreed that inflation assumptions thereafter would be ad-
justed if such overestimates occurred.
1
2
The Rebound in Real Faculty Salaries
Owing to their large share of university budgets, faculty salaries
inevitably exert a prodigious influence on overall university costs.
After a decade during which they lost ground to inflation, faculty
salaries moved ahead in real terms throughout the 1980s. The rela-
tively high rates of inflation in the 1970s eroded real faculty salaries.
As shown in Figure 3.3, general price inflation outstripped the an-
nual increases in average faculty salaries between 1971/72 and
1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991
Ending Fiscal Year
— Faculty Salaries — All Prices (GDP Price Deflator) I
Figure 3.3 Annual Increase in Faculty Salaries and Prices.
Source: Academe (March/April 1992) Table 1; and U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (1993)
p. 352.
Note: The years shown on the horizontal axis refer to the change from the previous academic
year. For example, 1973 refers to the change between the 1971/72 and 1972/73 academic years.66 BOOM TIMES FOR SELECTIVE INSTITUTIONS
1980/81, leading to a 16 percent decline in the average faculty salary
over the period. However, this relationship was reversed beginning
with the 1981/82 academic year. Whether a result of an effort to
restore the buying power lost during the recent inflationary period
or of the surprisingly low inflation that now characterized the econ-
omy, or a combination of the two factors, real faculty salaries
rebounded smartly, as shown in Figure 3.4. Between 1980/81 and
1991/92, both the average faculty salary and the salary of full pro-
fessors alone increased in real terms by 18 percent. For assistant pro-
fessors, the increase was 20 percent. By 1992, these average salaries,




As significant as it was, when compared with the trajectories of
earnings in other professional groups, this improvement in the real
salaries of faculty was by no means extraordinary. For example, in
the period from 1980 to 1992, when the earnings of full professors
increased at an average annual rate of 1.3 over inflation, the real
earnings of nonsupervisory attorneys increased at a 1.1 percent an-
nual rate, those of chief legal officers at 1.4 percent, and those of
physicians at 2.3 percent.
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Figure 3.4 Average Faculty Salaries, Two Levels.
Source: Table 3A.4.WHAT WAS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT THE 1980s? 67
p. 66), some groups fared even better, notably surgeons, Wall Street
lawyers, and chief executive officers of Fortune 500 companies.
The rebound in faculty salaries is reflected in the broader index of
input prices measured in the HEPI, shown in Figure 3.5, which gives
substantial weight to faculty salaries and other wage payments.
1
5
From the perspective of a given college or university, are faculty
salaries and the prices of other important inputs properly viewed as
an exogenous force to be reckoned with, as in the textbook firm,
which purchases inputs in competitive factor markets? Certainly this
model of competitive factor markets appears to fit the bill when it
comes to buying most manufactured equipment or to the hiring of
new faculty in the national market for academic labor. For these
inputs, the institutions wishing to hire or purchase have little choice
but to pay the salaries and other prices set by the market. But, be-
cause they are among the largest firms in their local markets, many
colleges and universities hold some of the power of the monopsonist,
particularly in the case of faculty and staff who are tied to a locality;
to this extent, an institution can exert some control over the salaries
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Figure 3.5 Inflation: All Prices and the HEPI.
Source: Data are from Research Associates of Washington (1994).68 BOOM TIMES FOR SELECTIVE INSTITUTIONS
Trends in Federal Support
Federal programs are a significant source of revenue for higher edu-
cation in general and for research universities in particular, account-
ing for about 15 percent of current fund revenue of private colleges
and universities in 1991/92 (U.S. Department of Education 1994, Ta-
ble 318, p. 326). The largest share of these funds supports student
financial aid and university research. Figure 3.6 plots the real value
of federal expenditures for university research and for other post-
secondary programs (the most important of which were the cost of
grants and loans to students) from 1965 to 1992. As the graph
shows, the most prominent trend in this federal spending was the
leveling off that occurred after 1975, following a decade of rapid
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Figure 3.6 Federal Expenditures on Higher Education.
Source: Data are from U.S. Department of Education (1992), Table 345.
Note: Research refers to research at educational institutions. Total includes research as well
as on-budget federal support for postsecondary institutions.THE ESCALATION IN TUITIONS AT THE SAMPLE INSTITUTIONS 69
sponsored by the National Science Foundation, increased by $5.9
billion, in constant 1992 dollars, whereas other spending fell by $4.7
billion. Because it did not grow in real terms, federal funding as a
percentage of revenues of private colleges and universities fell dur-
ing the 1980s, from 18.8 percent in 1980/81 to 15.3 percent in
1991/92 (U.S. Department of Education 1994, Table 318, p. 326).
Two aspects of federal support of research appear to have made it
more difficult for the top research universities to receive support for
their research projects during this period. First, as Geiger and Feller
(1993) have shown, there was a subtle redistribution of research ac-
tivity among universities, with the premier research universities ac-
counting for a shrinking share of total research expenditures. As an
illustration, the share of all academic R&D expenditures accounted
for by the top 30 institutions fell from 45.1 percent in 1979/80 to
42.3 percent in 1989/90 (Geiger and Feller 1993, Table 2). Second,
equally subtle changes in the awarding of federal grants had the
effect of increasing the share of costs borne by institutions. Quite
apart from negotiated indirect cost rates, it apparently became much
more common for federal granting agencies to ask universities for
matching expenditures or cost sharing in the process of awarding
grants.
1
7 Regardless of whether negotiated indirect costs system-
atically fail to cover the full costs of research, as some have argued,
1
8
these trends had the effect of reducing the importance of federal
support to the top research universities.
As for other federal support, the most prominent shift was away
from grants and toward loans as the preferred form of student fi-
nancial aid. Counting loans at their face value, total federal student
financial aid decreased slightly between 1980/81 and 1988/89, from
$20.6 to $19.9 billion. This 3.7 percent decline was the combination
of a 31 percent increase in loans and a 36 percent decrease in grants
and college work-study. If the cost of loans was valued at one-half
the face value of the loans, then total federal support would have
decreased by 14.7 percent (Clotfelter et al. 1991, pp. 99-100).
1
9 Be-
cause econometric studies suggest that financial aid affects the en-
rollment decisions of college applicants, it is reasonable to believe
that these changes had an impact on enrollment patterns.
2
0
THE ESCALATION IN TUITIONS AT THE SAMPLE INSTITUTIONS
As we have seen, beginning in the late 1970s the tuition levels
charged by private colleges and universities surged, and all four in-
stitutions examined in the present study participated in this trend.70 BOOM TIMES FOR SELECTIVE INSTITUTIONS
For the 1976/77 academic year, Harvard charged $4,100 in tuition
and mandatory fees. By 1991/92, the comparable charge had risen
to $16,560, a fourfold increase, representing an average annual
growth rate of 9.3 percent. Nevertheless, among the four institu-
tions, Harvard's growth was the slowest. Duke's average rate was
10.1 percent, Chicago's was 10.2 percent, and Carleton's was 10.4
percent. Even accounting for the inflation over this period (5.7 per-
cent per year using the GDP price deflator), these increases in tu-
ition represented substantial increases in real dollars. Figure 3.7
plots the rise in the inflation-adjusted levels of tuition and fees for
the four institutions over the period 1976/77 to 1992/93 and adds
for comparison the average level for all the members of the Consor-
tium on Financing Higher Education (COFHE), a group of private,
selective institutions. It is readily apparent not only that the levels
marched relentlessly upward, but that they did so in close formation.
Except for occasional jumps—such as Harvard's and Carleton's in
the academic year ending in 1983, Chicago's in 1987, and Duke's in
1989—the four institutions more or less retained their positions and
did not diverge from the general trajectory denoted by the average
for all COFHE institutions.
The apparent bunching of tuitions and tuition increases is consis-
tent with the observations of Rothschild and White (1993), who note
that colleges and universities are aware of price differences and
avoid large divergences from institutions that they view as compet-
ing for the same students. In the case of highly selective institutions,
such as those studied here, the authors argue that the relevant mar-
ket of potential students is largely a national one. They further point
out that both colleges and universities in a given market are compet-
ing for some of the same students; universities are simply "multi-
product enterprises that operate in many markets," one of which
is the market for undergraduate education (Rothschild and White
1993, p. 23). Although this portrait of market awareness resonates
with most economists, little research on this behavior has been con-
ducted, other than that related to the Justice Department's investiga-
tions into the collaboration among institutions over financial aid
awards. Moreover, that collaboration applies to the pricing of educa-
tion for individual students more than it does to the setting of the
"sticker price" that is represented by published tuition and fees.
Nevertheless, close observation of individual institutions lends
weight to the notion that colleges and universities do pay close atten-
tion—both to the prices of their competitors and to how their own
price may affect the demand by potential matriculants. Comparisons
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tutions are easily obtained from informal contacts, surveys carried
out by such associations as COFHE or published college guides, such
as Petersons and Barrons. Information on admissions outcomes, mea-
sured by numbers of applications, acceptances, and matriculants, is
also readily available. Institutions appear to pay close attention to
this information and to consider the likely impact of their pricing
decisions on their admissions as well as on their budgets.
Carleton College whose budget committee deliberated in recorded
sessions about these issues, provides an illuminating example of how
one institution viewed itself in this market. The college routinely
used three groups of institutions for comparison: (1) a group of
Midwestern colleges, (2) a group of highly selective national colleges,
and (3) a group of highly selective national universities.
2
1 Through-
out the period covered by this study, Carleton had the highest tu-
ition among the first group but was below the average of each of the
other two. In setting its tuition each year, the college appeared to be
very aware of its place in these rankings and endeavored not to insti-
tute any policy that would change its position dramatically. In one
meeting, the college's pricing strategy was described explicitly as one
of maintaining a tuition level between those of the Midwestern col-
leges and the national colleges, a strategy that could be consistent
with this balancing of effects.
Not only was Carleton aware of its competitors' prices, the budget
committee's deliberations revealed considerable interest and not a
little sophistication regarding the effects of tuition increases on abil-
ity to attract good applicants. The director of admissions routinely
was invited to give advice about the likely effect of contemplated
tuition increases. During these sessions, he brought studies that have
become a staple for admissions offices in private selective institu-
tions, including "overlap" analyses of the success in attracting stu-
dents who had been accepted both to Carleton and to similar institu-
tions, as well as surveys of accepted students that asked why they did
or did not enroll at Carleton. With respect to the tuition ranges un-
der discussion at Carleton during this time, the prevailing belief ap-
peared to be that tuition increases would not have a serious impact
on the number or quality of the students applying to Carleton, but
that applicants' perceptions of the quality of the college would have
such an impact.
2
2 In fact, one report presented to the committee in
1980 called for a policy of "aggressive pricing."
2' In 1988, Carleton
president Stephen Lewis urged the committee to endorse an ex-
traordinary tuition increase, arguing that it would enable the college
to reduce the spending rate on the endowment.
2
4 In another discus-
sion, administrators expressed confidence that tuition increasesTHE ESCALATION IN TUITIONS AT THE SAMPLE INSTITUTIONS 73
could be undertaken without harm, because Carleton's tuition was
inexpensive relative to those of national institutions.
2
5
To put this line of discussion into the context in which the institu-
tions themselves were operating during this period, it is useful to
review some of the basic indicators of success in undergraduate ad-
missions. A fear underlying discussions surrounding the setting of
tuition, which is alternately spoken and implicit in the reported
meetings of the Carleton budget committee, is that excessive in-
creases will hurt the ability of the admissions office to attract able
students. To track admissions strength and comparative selectivity,
colleges and universities pay especially close attention to two indica-
tors: (1) the percentage of applicants to which an institution offers
admission; and (2) the percentage of accepted applicants who choose
to matriculate, the latter being known as the "yield rate." Other mea-
sures of the quality of matriculants also are used widely to indicate
selectivity, such as average standardized test scores or the percentage
of students with high rankings in their high schools.
Table 3.2 presents admissions data for the four institutions over
the period of study. By most standards, all four are very selective
indeed, with acceptance rates ranging from 57 to 17 percent in
1992, and yield rates from 31 to 74 percent. For all the institutions
with the exception of Harvard, these measures show clear trends:
acceptance rates declined, suggesting greater selectivity, and yield
rates declined as well. The latter trend would seem to indicate de-
creasing success in attracting matriculants. This interpretation is
doubtful, however, given the strong evidence that high school stu-
dents, especially those applying to selective colleges and universities,
were applying to a higher average number of institutions than in
previous years. Assuming that this increase in applications was di-
rected at a fairly constant set of institutions and that enrollments did
not increase, a fall in yield rates was the inevitable result. Yet, among
the four institutions studied here, Harvard seems to have been im-
mune from this particular effect. The third indicator shown in the
table, the percentage of students who were in the top 10 percent of
their high school classes, suggests an increase in the quality of enter-
ing classes at Carleton and Duke and no trend in those of the re-
maining two universities.
Despite sharp increases in tuition over this 15-year period, there-
fore, none of the four institutions examined here seems to have ex-
perienced any obvious ill effects. What did result, for all four, were
increases in the percentage of undergraduates who received need-
based financial aid. Because the formula that all the institutions used
to calculate financial aid was based on the difference between the74 BOOM TIMES FOR SELECTIVE INSTITUTIONS
TABLE 3.2
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Source: Peterson's Guide to Four-Year Colleges (Princeton, NJ: Peterson's Guides 1978,
1983, 1988, and 1993).
"Matriculants as percentage of accepted applicants.
NA: not available.
costs of attendance (of which tuition is the largest component) and
estimates of families' ability to pay, it is not surprising that an in-
creasing proportion of applicants would become eligible for such as-
sistance during a period in which tuitions increased faster than
incomes.LOFTY AMBITIONS IN A TIME OF PLENTY 75
LOFTY AMBITIONS IN A TIME OF PLENTY
As the previous chapter suggests, one consequence of the organiza-
tional peculiarities of private research universities is an all-encom-
passing striving for excellence, one that suffuses the culture of the
institution, manifests itself in a continually revised list of worthy but
unfunded projects, and is restrained only by the limited nature of
the available resources. During the 1980s, this insatiable appetite for
excellence encountered market forces highly favorable to their satis-
faction by means of increases in tuition—the principal source of rev-
enue for virtually all private research universities. Events conspired
to make the acceptance to one of the 50 most selective colleges and
universities a commodity with few peers—one that was rationed not
by price, but by "merit." These institutions, already enrolling a dis-
proportionate share of the nation's high-income students as well as
its most able students,
2
6 found the demand for spots in their entering
classes stimulated by good economic times among affluent house-
holds and by an apparently heightened appreciation for the type of
education that they were offering. The coincidence of these develop-
ments is suggested in Figure 3.8, which plots average tuition at pri-
vate universities and the mean income of the most affluent 20 per-
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Figure 3.8 Tuition and Top Quintile Average Income.
Source: Table 3A.1: U.S. Department of Education (1992), Table 301.
Note: Indices are relative to 1967 real values.76 BOOM TIMES FOR SELECTIVE INSTITUTIONS
1970s, both tuition and mean income accelerated after about 1980.
These trends do not prove anything about causation, but they do
provide one possible explanation for why demand for the limited
places at selective institutions increased after 1980.
Although they in no way determined behavior, these circum-
stances certainly made it easier for private institutions to raise tu-
itions at rates faster than those which would have been necessary
simply to maintain existing levels of quality.
2
7 Because virtually all
the selective institutions individually decided to increase their tuition
at similar rates, and all provided similar need-based financial aid to
undergraduates, no single institution damaged its ability to attract
able students. The result was an increase in tuition-based revenues
all around, some of which would be used to make up for shortfalls in
federal funding.
If correct, this interpretation of events offers at most a partial ex-
planation for increases in outlays during the 1980s. It may suggest
the means by which selective institutions were able to raise tuitions,
but it does not explain why this happened. It is hoped that a closer
examination of a few such institutions will provide a fuller and more
satisfying answer to this question.Appendix 3.1
Supplementary Tables for Chapter 3
TABLE 3A.1
Mean Family Incomes, Selected Percentile Ranges, 1967—1992,














































































































Source: Data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series
P60, No. 184, Money Income of Households, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1992
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), Table B—7; and author's calcu-
lations.78 SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3
TABLE 3A.2




























































































Source: Data are from U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1993), Table A—2.SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 79
TABLE 3A.3























































































Source: Data are from Academe (March/April 1992), Table 1; and U.S. Council of
Economic Advisers (1993), p. 352.80 SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3
TABLE 3A.4








































































































































Source: Calculations using AAUP Bulletin 58 (summer 1972), p. 197, Table 13; Aca-
deme (March/April 1992), p. 8, Table 1; and U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (1993),
p. 352.SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3 81
TABLE 3A.5












































































































































Source: Consortium on Financing Higher Education (1994), Appendix A; and Con-
sortium on Financing Higher Education (various years).
Note: Figures refer to tuition and mandatory fees.